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POLITICS AS LAW: THE CHEROKEE CASES
William F. Swindler*
"John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it," is
one of many aphorisms attributed to Andrew Jackson. The particu-
lar utterance was characteristic of Jackson's attitude toward- the
Supreme Court of the United States whenever it; or Congress, pre-
sumed to lay restraints upon the "imperial Presidency."' The words
also reflected Jackson's attitude toward Indian rights as they
amounted to restraints upon his notions of manifest destiny. "Old-
Hickory's" comment was provoked by the opinion of Chief Justice
Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia the 1832 case which might have
reopened the door that Cherokee Nation v. Georgia3 had closed the
year before, when Indian tribes sought to find'a judicial remedy for
unending encroachments upon their lands and steady compromis-
ing of their treaty rights.
Georgia land hunger had already indirectly involved that state in
the :8io case of Fletcher v. Peck,4 an impairment-of-contract issue
growing out of the notorious Yazoo land frauds on the banks of the
Mississippi. The Indian interest had been substantially compro-
mised in the 3.823 case of Johnson -. McIntosh,' when the Supreme
Court, speaking through Marshall, ruled that the native Americans
were not the original lords of the fee, or even tenants in fe6. If the
ruling in Cherokee Nation was thus foreshadowed, the unequivocal
ruling against Georgia in Worcester could only be answered (as it
was) by outright defiance of the Supreme Court by the state. The
impunity with which Georgia could do so was reflected in Jackson's
aphorism; a President who would not tolerate South Carolina's at-
tempted nullification of the tariff did not intend to apply the same
principle of federal supremacy to Indian land grabbing by another
state. Yet, as the irony of political events would have it, the ultimate
triumph of the constitutional principle in Worcester, as against
Cherokee Nation, meant the ultimate self-destruction of the nulli-
fication doctrine-but did not, in the process, restore the Cherokees'
rights.
The Cherokee interests litigated in 1831 and 1832 ultimately fell
victim to both political and judicial confrontations, their sacrifice
being the price of saving Marshall's constitutional doctrine from
* John Marshall Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Author, Court
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state and federal political attack and fixing it permanently in consti-
tutional practice. Thus, South Carolina's nullification effort, Geor-
gia's bellicose plan to extinguish Cherokee titles, Jackson's challenge
to Congress over the Second Bank of the United States, and several
legislative attempts to reduce the powers of the Supreme Court itself
were all part of the turbulent Jacksonian first term, which carried
over into the second. It is worth noting that 1832, when Worcester
was being decided, was the crucial political year, with Jackson's re-
election the test of whether the bank and tariff issues, at least,
would be pursued to their ultimate resolution.'
The tariff of 18z8 had been enacted by Congress at the same time
that Georgia had begun its legislative campaign to usurp federal
authority over Cherokee lands within its borders. In the incoming
federal administration, Georgia's power at the national level was
ascendant; Jackson's new Attorney General would be Georgia's Sen-
ator John M. Berrien, who had already established himself as a
vigorous advocate of his state's policies in extinguishing Creek title
rights. He would be supported on the state sovereignty issue by Vice
President John Calhoun of South Carolina; and, even after Calhoun
resigned to lead his state's nullification fight, the President pro
tempore of the Senate turned out to -be an ally-Hugh L. W~hite of
Tennessee, another state with designs on Cherokee land. When
Berrien himself was forced out of the Cabinet, a casualty of the
Peggy Eaton affair,8 Georgia's political power became even stronger.
To hold Georgia in line when its traditional and logical interest lay
in joining South Carolina on the nullification principle, Jackson let
it be known that he was sympathetic to Georgia's state sovereignty
claim on the Cherokee lands.9
The political scrambling for advantage was to involve and jeopar-
dize the integrity of the Supreme Court itself. Once more, as so
often in the course of Marshall's long Chief Justiceship, a congres-
sional attack was being launched upon the Court's jurisdiction. In
the second session of the Twenty-First Congress, the House Judiciary
Committee reported out with favor a Georgia-inspired bill which
proposed amendments to the jurisdictional provisions of the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789;10 the effect of the bill would be to review the
Georgia legislation on the Cherokee question. 1 In 1831, when the
first Cherokee case came on for argument, the Bank of the United
States cast its shadow-most of the leading attorneys for the Chero-
kees were stockholders or other interested parties, and thus tarred
with the Bank's brush so far as Jackson was concerned. The influence
this factor had in determining executive policy toward carrying out
a judgment in this original action remains hypothetical. By the time
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the 1832 Worcester case was decided, an equally abrasive political
factor had entered the picture: William Wirt, chief counsel for the
Cherokees and a former Attorney General of the United States, was
to be a candidate for the presidency (on the Anti-Masonic ticket),
againstJackson.
All of this political activity was quite apart from the moral issues
(to the extent that the law might consider such) of the Cherokee
cases themselves.? These moral issues took on color of law (at least),
from the prolonged vacillation of the United States regarding the
provisions set out in the Cherokee treaty of 179L,"3 the conditions
attached by Georgia to its cession of its western lands to the nation
in 18o2Ux which the United States had accepted, and the federal
policy begun in 1819 of encouraging the Cherokees to believe that
they were being assured of quiet possession and enjoyment of their
lands in Georgia and elsewhere by settling permanently on their
estates.'" Even Georgia could make a case for injury to its interest in
the failure of the United States, under the terms of the 18o2 cession,
to purchase lands from the Cherokees in the same proportions that
it had made purchases of Creek and Chickasaw lands in other states;
meanwhile, the Cherokees saw the federal policy as a recognition by
the government of the fact that the Indian settlers in Georgia did
not want to sell or move.' 6
Georgia's intransigence regarding its exclusive sovereignty in In-
dian affairs had been demonstrated in the autumn of 1830 in the
Corn Tassel case, which had culminated in the execution of a young
Cherokee tried and convicted of murder under state rather than
Indian law.' 7 Defense counsel had applied to the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of error, but Governor William Gilmer
had referred the writ, when received, to the state legislature, which
by resolution directed "the Governor and every officer of the state to
disregard any and every mandate and process that should be served
upon them" in the matter' 8 Although the Georgia legislative action
was clearly in defiance of the supremacy clause of the Constitution,"
states' rightists were in power and heady with arrogance, declaring
that the doctrine of nullification was now a practical accomplish-
ment. With one of their own in the office of Attorney General, and
a President who had clearly indicated on numerous occasions that he
would not do anything to protect Indian interests under federal au-
thority,20 Georgia had little worry as to the policy of the national
executive department. Even though the states' rightists did not domi-
nate the judicial branch,21 there was help in prospect from the Con-
gress. In January, 1831, the judiciarybill was introduced and reported
out in the House of Representatives," less than a month after the
Supreme Court issued its subpoena to Governor Gilmer in the case
of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.23
Law, Politics, and Indian Titles
While the complex legal details of titles to Indian lands are be-
yond the scope of this present short paper, the Cherokee cases of
1833 nd.1832 can best be understood in the context of the 1823
Johnson v. McIntosh24 case, as well as in the unstable matrix of law,
policy, and politics which characterized other government actions
in Indian affairs up to that time. The 1823 case involved millions of
acres in what are now the states of Illinois and Indiana, purchases of
this*land by agents of the Ohio Company of Virginia prior to the
American Revolution, and the subsequent test of best title to the
purchased tracts. In July, 1773, one of the purchases was made from
the Illinois or Kaskaskia Indians, and the second was made in
October,- 1775, from the Wabash Indians-more than 5,oooooo
acres eventually being involved.25 In 1778, the new Commonwealth
of Virginia established a County of IllinoisF6 as the governing au-
thority over the area and its French and Indian inhabitants, after it
had been captured from the British by George Rogers Clark. In
1783, Virginia ceded to the United States all of the territory north-
west of the Ohio River 27
The national government proceeded to organize the Northwest
Territory and subsequently the Iidiana Territory therefrom; 2 and,
under the provisions of the federal statutes,2 9 granted to William
McIntosh a tract of 3 1,56o acres in'fee simple. The heirs of Thomas
Johnson, one of the grantees under the Ohio Company purchase of
1775, sought a writ of ejectment against McIntosh. The cohstitu-
tional question was thus presented in classic terms of real property:*
what estate in the land did the Indians have to convey in 1773 or
1775?30
In McIntosh, as in Cherokee Nation which it foreshadowed, Chief
Justice Marshall was to make a political determination at the outset:
any finding of original title in the Indians, making them lords of the
fee, would be unenforceable in the United States of 18z3. It was now
too late--two and a half centuries after the English had taken pos-
session of lands in "Virginia" (North Carolina's coastal strips) in
the name of Elizabeth I-to reverse or revise history.31 The opinion,
to the extent that it took Indian interests into account at all, aimed
toward making the best accommodation possible for those interests;
how good an accommodation it was may be read in the history of
Indian land law in the ensuing century.
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Marshall declared in essence that absolute title to New World
estates vested in the European nations discovering and taking pos-
session of the land, that the original inhabitants had a right to oc-
cupancy only, and that absolute title to the lands in question vested
in Great Britain by right of conquest of New France (which had first
acquired such title). This title in turn devolved from Britain to the
United States in the Treaty of Peace in 1783 and the cession in that
same year of the lands northwest of the Ohio by Virginia. In any
case, the purchases of 1773 and 1775 were void, even if arguably the
acts of agents of a British government (colonial Virginia), because
they violated the Royal Prbclamation of 1763 barring white settle-
ment beyond a demarcation line setting aside Indian lands
The ambiguities in McIntosh&--Marshall spoke of the United
States as having a right comparable to "seisin irn fee" and the Indians
as having an interest equivalent to a "lease for years"-were com-
pounded by ambivalent and inconsistent federal policy as well. Un-
der the Georgia cession of western lands in i8oz,3 4 the United States
had undertaken to extinguish Indian claims to land within the state
borders when and as this 6ould be effected "peaceably" and on
"reasonable. terms." But, by the 182o's, the Cherokees and other
tribes had accepted federal grants to convert themselves from a hunt-
ing economy to a permanent farming economy,; and in 1827 the
Cherokees adopted a constitution declaring themselves independent
and sovereign over their land. Despite having been put on notice by
receiving copies of this constitution,36 the federal government cre-
ated further ambiguities which the Court would have to try to re-
solve in Cherokee Nation.
The Fird Cherokee Case
The opening of the Georgia legislative attack had begun with a
resolution in Dedember, 18z7, declaring that the Cherokees per-
manently settled in the state were tenants at will, over whom the
laws of the sovereign state extended and to which laws they were sub-
ject7 The legislature then proceeded to enact a series of statutes
dividing the lands into counties and annulling "all laws, usages and
customs" of the Indians, licensing the whites who were seeking resi-
dence in the area, and placing the newly discovered gold mines in
Cherokee territory under state guard."
The Georgia delegates in Congress furthered the state annexation
strategy by introducing, and eventually winning enactment of; -the
first major removal statute in 383o. 9 Threatened by both state and
federal legislation, the *Cherokees somewhat belatedly resolved to
test their constitutional rights in the judiciary. They engaged Wil-
liam Wirt and John Sergeant, a well-known Philadelphia attorney,
to seek an original action fdr injunction in the Supreme Court.40
Wirt, in the light of the considerable political forces which had been
generated by this time, took a step which today would be regarded
as ethically questionable when he sought to find from Chief Justice
Marshall whether it was worth the effort to attempt the action.4' The
Chief Justice replied, through a mutual friend-Judge Dabney Carr
of Virginia-that he had "wished, most sincerely, that both the ex-
ecutive and legislative departments had thought differently on the
subject." He added: "Humanity must bewail the course which is
pursued, whatever may be the decision of policy. '42 His words could
not be taken as reassuring.
Marshall was quite aware of the political forces lined up against
his Court; not since the all-out campaigns of the Jeffersonians three
decades before had the independence of the judiciary been so threat-
ened. His close associate, Justice Joseph Story, saw in the proposed
judiciary act "an extraordinary state of things; the government of the
country was laboring to tread down the power on which its very
existence depends" in that a limit on jurisdiction "would deprive the
Supreme Court of the power to revise the decisions in the state
courts and state legislatures, in all cases in which they were repug-
nant to the Constitution of the United States."43 Justice Smith
Thompson saw the legislative attacks on judicial independence as
tending "to resolve the Government of the Union into the national
imbecility of the old Confederation."
The invitation to hale the sovereign state of Georgia into federal
court was politically explosive in the highest degree. While it was
predictable that Georgia would simply decline to appear, thus mak-
ing a default judgment almost certain,45 this would only compound
the confrontation. What would happen if a United States marshal
then undertook to execute the judgment? "Heretofore," wrote Story,
the Court has met with the certainty that its orders, judgments
and decrees would be carried into effect by the executive branch
of the Government, however much they might conflict with the
interests, prejudices, or preopossessions of the parties or of the
states. It has now met with the full knowledge that the executive
will not enforce its decisions, if they are counter to his views of
constitutional law.40
William Wirt also recognized the practical problems in the clos-
ing portion of his oral argument for the Cherokees. "Shall we be
asked (the question has been asked elsewhere) how this Court will
enforce its injunction, in case it shall be awarded? I answer, it will be
time enough to meet that question when it shall arise." 47 This was
easy enough for counsel to say, but Marshall, who had by now weath-
ered 30 years of recurrent political attacks, could not help but discern
the illusory element in Wirt's conclusion: "In pronouncing your
decree you will have declared the law; and it is part of the sworn duty
of the President of the United States to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed'.... If he refuses to perform this duty, the Con-
stitution has provided a remedy." 3
The ailing, 75-year-old Chief Justice obviously sought to let the
cup pass from his lips. "If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted,
and that still greater are to be apprehended," he said at the con-
clusion of the Court's opinion denying jurisdiction, "this is not the
tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future." 49 The
opinion had taken refuge in a strained line of reasoning: the Chero-
kee Nation was not a foreign nation in the sense that international
law defined sovereign powers, and, hence, the Cherokees had no
standing to bring the action in the Supreme Court. 0 It is striking
that the man who had erected federal power on the cornerstone of
the commerce clause, and had felt strongly enough on the conse-
quent principle of the paramount nature of federal power to defend
it in articles written in the popular press,51 should now evade the
basic issue. The commerce clause itself recognized the distinction,
specifically providing that Congress had the power to regulate com-
merce respectively among "foreign nations," "the several states," and
"Indian tribes."52
The 4-2 opinion of a badly divided Court-Justice Gabriel Duvall
was absent, Justices William Johnson and Henry Baldwin wrote
lengthy concurring opinions, and Justice Thompson wrote a dissent
in which Story joinedu--labored the commerce clause distinction
between foreign nations and Indian tribes without reaching the
fundamental fact that the clause vested exclusive control in the fed-
eral government over both. All too plainly, Marshall was concerned
primarily with avoiding, even if only postponing, the ultimate po-
litical issue: "The bill requires us to control the legislature of Geor-
gia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force. The propriety
of such an interposition by the Court may be well questioned. It
savors too much of the exercise of political power to be within the
proper province of the judicial department.""4
Marshall, in fact, did leave an opening for a further attack on the
Georgia usurpations: "the mere question of right to their lands
might perhaps be decided by the Court in a proper case with proper
parties," he had said in dictum.5 This alternative was reiterated in
Thompson's dissent: "Relief to the full extent prayed by the bill may
be beyond the reach of this court," he wrote in recognition of po-
litical realities. "Much of the matter therein contained by way of
complaint would seem to depend for relief upon the exercise of
political power; and as such appropriately devolving upon the execu-
tive, and not the judicial department of government. This court can
grant relief so far only as the rights of person or property are drawn in
question, and have been infringed' 6 Thompson then proceeded to
discuss at length the legal standing of the Cherokees before the
Court, and concluded that in his view (and Story's), the question in
Marshall's dictum was already before the Justices: counsel had estab-
lished "a direct and palpable infringement of the rights of property,"
and this required "a prohibitory writ to restrain a party fromi doing a
wrong or injury to the rights of another," as the Court had already
recognized in an injunction proceeding in a second Bank case.57
The whole business deeply troubled the Chief Justice; "[I] f courts
were permitted to indulge their sympathies," he had said at the
outset of his opinion, "a case better calculated to excite them can
hardly be imagined."5 8 Now that it was over-the Court's short
winter term had ended-Marshall knew that he had only put off the
inevitable, and in the fall of 1831 he was seriously considering re-
signing. "I cannot be insensible to the gloom that lours [sic] over
us," he wrote to Story, acknowledging a combination of "circum-
stances vhich is almost invincible." He dreaded to end his career,
he confessed, in a judicial process which would become "a mere
inefficient pageant."5 9 The prospect of losing Marshall from the
Court had haunted others throughout the struggle; John Quincy
Adams, noting such an expression from Wirt the previous winter,
had worried that "some shallow-pated wild-cat, ... fit for nothing
but to tear the Union to rags and tatters, would be appointed in his
place."60 The Cherokee cases marked a low point in constitutional
fortunes, in more ways than one.
The Second Cherokee Case
If Cherokee Nation *as intended to buy time for the Court, it
bought very little;. .the states' rightists did not intend to relax the
pressure of their challenge. Accordinglyr, a .writ of error issued from
the Supreme Court October 27, 1831, tcr the'Superior Court of the
County bf Gwvinnett.-one of thecounties carved out of the Chero-
kee lands-in tfhe'case of Worcester v. .Geor'gia.61 Copies were duly
served on the governor and attoiney general of the state, referred
again to the legislature for instruction, 'and dismissed by the state
with a resolution directing its officers to ignore the process. In Feb-
ruary, 1832, Wirt and Sergeant again appeared for the petitioners,
and again the state of Georgia was unrepresented. On March 3, 1832,
the Chief Justice, for a 6-i majority, held Georgia's laws bearing on
the matter unconstitutional because exclusive jurisdiction over In-
dian affairs was vested in the United States.62 Two days later, a man-
date ordering the release of Worcester and his codefendant was di-
rected to the Georgia officials. Unconsciously countering Andrew
Jackson's aphorism, Story wrote: "The Court has done its duty. Let
the Nation now do theirs. 63
Samuel A. Worcester and Elizur Butler were two missionaries
who had long lived among the Cherokees and counseled them to
stand upon their rights under the treaties and the Constitution. It
was this type of white settler that the Georgia legislature sought to
exclude by its 1830 law requiring all whites living in Cherokee coun-
try to obtain a license and take an oath of allegiance to the state.
When the missionaries, and several of their fellow workers, refused
to seek the license or leave the area, they were arrested, convicted,
and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. On writ of error, the de-
fendants then sought review of their case in the Supreme Court.
In preparation for its case against the missionaries, Georgia had
collected part of its political debt from President Jackson. The initial
arrest of Worcester and Thompson had misfired; the trial court had
released them, finding that as licensed clergymen empowered to dis-
pense federal funds for "civilizing" and settling Indians, the de-
fendants were presumably federal agents. Worcester, moreover, was
postmaster of New Echota. Jackson, upon pro forma inquiry from
Georgia officials, had denied that the missionaries qua missionaries
were federal agents, and had removed Worcester from his postmas-
tership. The prosecution began again, and in due course, the fore-
gone conclusion of the outcome of the trials came on for review."
Although Marshall found himself on firmer procedural ground-
the question now was not one of standing to bring an original suit,
but of appellate review of state actions trenching upon federal power
-his opinion was essentially a retraction of much that had been
central to the Cherokee Nation opinion. He accepted the premise of
the earlier case, that an Indian nation stood in a special relationship
to the United States; but now it was not a question of the Indian na-
tion's right to sue but of federal government power, and the right of
the Court to protect those entitled to rely on that power. The Chief
Justice summarily rejected Georgia's challenge to the jurisdiction,
reviewed in detail the history of European colonial powers' relations
with Indians, and concluded-as the commerce clause provided-
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that commercial relations with the Indians conclusively and ex-
clusively descended from Great Britain to the United States. Geor-
gia's laws, held the Court, "interfere forcibly with the relations
established between the United States and the Cherokee Nation,
the regulation of which, according to the settled provisions of our
Constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the
Union."'6 5
John Marshall had made his decision; now Andrew Jackson had to
make his-or so it seemed. The Court, in fact, did not force the issue;
it neglected to prepare a new mandate which federal marshals would
presumably have been required to enforce. Accordingly, the Presi-
dent was not compelled as a matter of law to do anything. However,
other events of 183z not only subordinated the Cherokee cases as
critical national issues, but, in the paradoxically reversing poles of
politics, enabled Jackson himself to emerge at the end of the year as
the champion of national power and the ardent advocate of judicial
authority to enforce the power. In July, he sent to Congress his veto
message on the bill to extend the charter of the Bank of the United
States,-' in November, South Carolina threw down a gauntlet in its
Nullification Ordinance;67 and in December, Jackson responded with
his Proclamation Against Nullification.
The South Carolina ordinance had gone several steps beyond the
resolutions of the Georgia legislature instructing Georgia officials
not to answer any federal process. It had forbidden any state courts
to issue any copy of the record of a case for which the parties were
seeking review in the Supreme Court and defined the attempt to seek
review to be in contempt."" Jackson's response was in proportion to
the state action; such action, said his Proclamation, was rebellion
and treason, and he called upon Congress to draft legislation clari-
fying the power of the federal courts to visit criminal penalties on
all state officers guilty of attempting to carry the ordinance into
effect. The "force bill" of 183370 vested in the federal judiciary more
statutory authority to establish paramount national power than the
Marsha.l Court had ever asserted in any of its greatest decisions. 71
The final irony was the fact that Georgia's nullification posture
was undercut by South Carolina's overreaching ordinance. Jackson
made it clear in his message to Congress that he would enforce any
mandate the Supreme Court issued in cases where it held that a state
was attempting to nullify a constitutional power of the national gov-
ernment. Once more, political realities determined the situation.
With its extremism in nullification, South Carolina had destroyed
the presidential chances of its own favorite son, John Calhoun;
Jackson had defeated the Bank lobby, and his heir apparent, Martin
:L6
Van Buren, would carry on his program after 1836. The time had
come to salvage what could be salvaged; accordingly, the Georgia
governor issued a pardon to Worcester and Butler in return for their
withdrawal of their original suit72
In the end, it could be said that Samuel Worcester had won a
moral victory, and it could similarly be said that John Marshall in
Worcester had won a moral victory. In the latter instance, it was
more a matter of luck-political luck-that converted the apparent
flouting of the rule of law as represented in judicial review into the
establishment of the principle as the capstone of constitutional gov-
ernment. Three decades before, at the start of his great career, Mar-
shall had shown himself a consummate judicial politician in out-
witting the Jeffersonians in Marbury v'. Madison.73 At the close of
that career, in the Cherokee cases, he had, rather, been carried along
by events. Yet, in historical perspective, the aftermath of the Chero-
kee cases, and especially Worcester, may be seen as the logical cul-
mination of the Marshall Court's insistent doctrine of the supremacy
of the powers expressed or reasonably derived from the Constitution.
The ultimate losers, of course-as throughout most of the history
of the nation which flowered from the dust of their hopes-were the
Cherokees. On the strength of the doctrine in the 1831 case, Georgia
continued unabated expansion into the Cherokee lands. And within
the decade that began with Marshall's valedictory opinions, the
Cherokees themselves began the trail of tears.
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